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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-3842
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ISHMAEL GARRETT,
Appellant

____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 09-cr-00241-009)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 23, 2012
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 13, 2012)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Ishmael Garrett appeals his judgment of sentence on drug-related crimes. He asks
us to revisit whether a prior conviction under Pennsylvania‘s misdemeanor resisting arrest
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statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104, qualifies as a ―crime of violence‖ under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). Because we have previously held that resisting
arrest in Pennsylvania is a crime of violence, United States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 466
(3d Cir. 2010), and because the District Court correctly assessed Garrett‘s criminal
history, we will affirm.
I
We write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, so we review only
briefly the essential facts and procedural history.
Garrett pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and two counts
of distribution and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Because Garrett was designated a career
offender, his offense level was 31 and his criminal history category was VI, which
resulted in a Guidelines range of 188–235 months‘ imprisonment. The Government
recommended a downward departure of two offense levels for substantial assistance,
which would have resulted in a Guidelines range of 151–188 months.
At sentencing, Garrett objected to his designation as a career offender, arguing that
his Pennsylvania state conviction for resisting arrest was not a crime of violence. The
District Court disagreed. Nevertheless, on the strength of the Government‘s motion for
downward departure, and after considering Garrett‘s individual history and
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characteristics, the District Court sentenced Garrett to a term of 110 months‘
imprisonment to be followed by a four-year term of supervised release.
II
Garrett raises three issues on appeal: (1) the District Court‘s decision to classify
him as a career offender; (2) the assessment of criminal history points for his prior
convictions; and (3) the Court‘s failure to vary downward even further based on overrepresentation of his criminal history.
We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion, looking first for
procedural error and then examining the sentence for substantive reasonableness. United
States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2008). We review a district court‘s legal
interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d
Cir. 2007) (en banc). ―[I]f [an] asserted procedural error is purely factual, our review is
highly deferential and we will conclude there has been an abuse of discretion only if the
district court‘s findings are clearly erroneous.‖ Wise, 515 F.3d at 217. In evaluating a
challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we must affirm ―unless no
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.‖ United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d
558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
A
Garrett argues that the District Court erred in designating him a career offender
3

because his Pennsylvania conviction for resisting arrest is not a crime of violence. Nor is
it a predicate offense, Garrett contends, because he initially received an aggregate
sentence of only twelve months‘ probation for the crime. Garrett is incorrect on both
counts.
According to Pennsylvania‘s resisting arrest statute,
[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with the intent of
preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any
other duty, the person [1] creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the
public servant or anyone else, or [2] employs means justifying or requiring
substantial force to overcome the resistance.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104.
To qualify as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, Garrett must have
―at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense.‖ USSG § 4B1.1(a). The Guidelines define a ―crime of violence‖ to
include any offense that
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.
USSG § 4B1.2(a).
Garrett contends that his conviction for resisting arrest is not a crime of violence.
But we held precisely the opposite in Stinson, 592 F.3d at 464–66, which Garrett failed to
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cite in his opening brief.1 Garrett claims that because he only briefly fled from police and
quickly surrendered, his actions underlying his resisting arrest offense do not involve
―purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct‖ and therefore do not amount to a crime of
violence. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,144–45 (2008) (finding New
Mexico‘s DUI offense was not a violent felony in part because it does not involve
―purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct‖).
Garrett‘s argument fails because Stinson established that a conviction under 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 5104 satisfies the second clause of the definition of ―crime of violence,‖ in
which the phrase ―physical force‖ does not appear. Stinson held that both means of
violating the Pennsylvania resisting arrest statute—―[1] creat[ing] a substantial risk of
bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or [2] employ[ing] means justifying or
requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance‖—fit within the residual clause of
the Guidelines definition because § 5104 does not cover passive resistance, such as ―lying
down‖ or ―going limp.‖ Stinson, 592 F.3d at 465–66. Therefore, it criminalized only
―purposeful, violent, and aggressive‖ acts that present a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another. Id. at 466 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 144). Even assuming Garrett
accurately frames the conduct that led to his resisting arrest conviction, running from the

1

Counsel is cautioned in future cases to be mindful that ―[a] lawyer shall not
knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client . . . .‖ Pa. Rule of
Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(2) (2012).
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police to avoid arrest ―involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to
another‖ as distinguished from mere passive resistance. Therefore, Garrett‘s resisting
arrest offense falls squarely within Stinson‘s definition of a crime of violence.
Garrett also argues that his resisting arrest conviction cannot be counted as a crime
of violence because he initially received a sentence of twelve months‘ probation. Under
USSG § 4B1.1, a sentence for resisting arrest should be counted toward career offender
status only if ―the sentence was a term of probation of more than one year or a term of
imprisonment of at least thirty days . . . .‖ See USSG § 4B1.2 cmt 3 (citing USSG
§ 4A1.2(c)). Garrett‘s initial sentence is immaterial, however, because his probation was
revoked and he was resentenced to 23 days to 23½ months‘ imprisonment. That sentence
is implicated by the Guidelines, which state:
Revocation of probation, parole, supervised release, special parole, or
mandatory release may affect the time period under which certain sentences
are counted as provided in § 4A1.2(d)(2) and (e).
USSG § 4A1.2(k)(2).
Under § 4A1.2(e)(1), ―[a]ny prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year
and one month that was imposed within the fifteen years of the defendant‘s
commencement of the instant offense is counted.‖ Garrett‘s revocation sentence of 23½
months imprisonment was imposed on June 2, 2004. Garrett‘s offense conduct, which at
the very latest occurred in March 2009 when he sold cocaine to a confidential source, fell
within the required fifteen year window. Thus, it counts toward career offender status
6

under § 4B1.1.
For these reasons, the District Court did not err in finding that Garrett‘s previous
conviction for resisting arrest qualified as a predicate offense for purposes of the career
offender Guideline.
B
Garrett next argues that the District Court erred in assessing one criminal history
point for his conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and
three criminal history points for resisting arrest. We disagree.
Garrett contends that he should have been assessed no points for his July 14, 1999
conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Under USSG
§ 4A1.1(c), a defendant should receive one point unless the sentence was ―imposed more
than ten years prior to the defendant‘s commencement of the instant offense . . . .‖
§ 4A1.1(c) cmt 3. As reviewed above, Garrett‘s offense conduct dates back to at least
March of 2009, when he sold cocaine to a confidential informant. Because March 2009 is
within ten years of July 1999, the District Court was correct to assess Garrett one point
for his controlled substance conviction.
Garrett also argues that he should have been assessed one point for his resisting
arrest conviction instead of three points under §§ 4A1.1(a) and 4A1.2(c) because he was
originally sentenced to twelve months‘ probation. This initial sentence is of no help to
Garrett, however, because he was sentenced to 23½ months in prison after his probation
7

was revoked. Accordingly, USSG § 4A1.2(c) does not apply.
For the reasons stated, the District Court did not err in assessing Garrett one point
for his controlled substance conviction and three points for his resisting arrest conviction.
C
Finally, Garrett contends that his Guidelines range should have been 70–87 months
because he should have had nine criminal history points and an offense level of 23. This
argument is based on the fallacious premises that the Court improperly found Garrett to
be a career offender and that he should have been assessed no criminal history points for
his controlled substance conviction and one point for resisting arrest. As we have
explained, the District Court correctly found Garrett to be a career offender and properly
assessed one and three points for the controlled substance and resisting arrest convictions,
respectively.
Alternatively, Garrett argues that even if the Court correctly computed his
Guidelines range, a downward variance was nonetheless justified considering the
discretionary factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because his career offender status overrepresented his criminal history. The District Court took into account the Presentence
Investigation Report and the Government‘s departure recommendation. It also considered
Garrett‘s requests for a downward departure and for a variance under § 3553(a). The
Court‘s final sentencing determination was 110 months‘ imprisonment, which was 41
months below what the Guidelines range would have been following the Government‘s
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motion and 30 months below what the Guidelines range would have been had the District
Court applied a one-category reduction for over-representation. See USSG
§ 4A1.3(b)(3)(A). Because the record shows that the District Court adequately
considered the § 3553(a) factors, we cannot find that the sentence as a whole was
substantively unreasonable. See Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 (―The touchstone of
‗reasonableness‘ is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).‖).
Accordingly, the District Court did not commit procedural or substantive error in
imposing Garrett‘s sentence.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‘s judgment of
sentence.
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